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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LAURALEE CURTIS,

*

Plaintiff-Appellant,

*

vs.

*

Case No. 890210-CA

*

WILLIAM GREGORY CURTIS,
Defendant-Respondent.

*
*
*

Argument Priority
Classification No. 7

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a3(2)(h).
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from (1) a final Order dismissing the
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in Contempt for failure to return
the children from visitation, and (2) from a final Order
enforcing a Mississippi Order which modified custody from the
already existing Utah Decree of Divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the trial court err in hold that Mississippi had

properly established jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)?

1

II.

Did the trial court err in finding that Mrs. Curtis'

personal appearance in the Mississippi litigation transferred
UCCJA jurisdiction to Mississippi?
3.

Did the trial court err in failing to apply the

provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) in
resolving the conflicting claims of Utah and Mississippi?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5(3):
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental
care, or the .distribution of the property as is
reasonable and necessary.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann.,
§ 78-45c-l et. seq.
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A.,
§ 1738A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal concerning the proper jurisdiction to
bring a divorce modification on the issue of custody.

On January

12, 1989 Judge Boyd L. Park, from the Fourth Judicial District
Court, heard proffer of counsel on an objection to the Domestic
Commissioner's recommendation that Utah had continuing
jurisdiction over custody and had not relinquished jurisdiction
to Mississippi and did not recognize the Mississippi Orders.

The

Commissioner ordered that the children not be removed from the
2

state and that if Mr. Curtis came to Utah, he should have only
supervised visitation.

On March 7, 1989 Judge Park reversed the

Commissioner's recommendation and issued a final Order dismissing
the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in Contempt for failure to
return the children from visitation and entered an Order
enforcing the Mississippi Order which modified custody from the
already existing Utah Decree of Divorce.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law were entered pursuant to a stipulation by the parties on
December 4, 1987 by the Honorable Domestic Commissioner Howard H.
Maetani of the Fourth Judicial District Court.

(R. 66)

Just

over two months later, on February 12, 1988, Mr. Curtis took the
children for visitation.

(R. 406)

He went to Mississippi and

got a protective order against Mrs. Curtis entered on February
16, 1988 and remained in Mississippi. (R. 379)

February 26,

1988, Mrs. Curtis' attorney in Mississippi filed a Motion to
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction which was not ruled on until
after a hearing conducted February 29 through March 2, 1988.
258)

(R.

Both parties were present and represented by counsel in

Mississippi.

(R. 408)

At the conclusion of the hearing, a

protective order was entered against Mrs. Curtis.

(R. 258)

On

March 8, 1988 the Court denied Mrs. Curtis' Motion to Dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.

(R. 258)

The Mississippi Court took the

3

Modification of a Foreign Decree under advisement.

(R. 258)

On

August 9, 1988, the Mississippi Court took the case from under
advisement and ruled that Mississippi did not have the proper
jurisdiction to Modify the Utah Decree of Divorce.

(R. 208-213)

The Mississippi Court ruled that both states could lay claim to
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, but the terms of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act made it clear Utah was the state of
proper jurisdiction.
Protective Order.

However, they did not dissolve the

(R. 213)

When the Mississippi Court ruled they did not have proper
jurisdiction, but would not return her children because of the
Protective Order, Mrs. Curtis contacted Legal Services in Utah.
On August 17, 1988 Mrs. Curtis signed an Affidavit in Support of
an Order to Show Cause in Contempt for failure to return the
children from visitation.

(R. 259)

Because of difficulty in

locating Mr. Curtis he was not served with the Order to Show
Cause in Contempt until October.

(R. 259, 260)

On September 23, 1988, Mrs. Curtis' Mississippi counsel
filed a Motion to Dissolve the Protective Order.

(R. 259)

On

October 7, 1988, Mrs. Curtis took the children back to Utah in
accord with the Utah order that had not been modified and the
Mississippi petition for modification having been dissolved.
259)

(R.

On October 24, 1988, Mr. Curtis filed contempt charges

against Mrs. Curtis and filed a new Motion to Modify the Decree
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of Divorce, under the same civil number as the already dismissed
Petition.

(R. 259-260)

Because the Mississippi Courts had kept

the Protective Order in force for eight months, even though the
Mississippi Courts recognized that they did not initially have
the authority to modify the Utah Decree, the Mississippi Court
found that it did have jurisdiction over the children on the new
Petition to Modify because the children had lived in Mississippi
for longer than six months, in accordance with one provision in
the UCCJA.
On November 10, 1988 the Order to Show Cause in contempt was
conducted in Utah.

Commissioner Maetani ordered that Utah had

continuing jurisdiction and had not relinquished jurisdiction to
Mississippi and therefore Utah did not recognize the orders made
by the Mississippi Courts.
objection to this decision.

(R. 260)

Mr. Curtis filed an

(R. 377)

On November 22, 1988 the Mississippi Court issued an order
requiring Mrs. Curtis to appear.

(R. 260)

When she did not, the

court held her in contempt and issued sanctions.
December 6, 1988, the Mississippi Court ruled on the new
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce that because the
children had been in Mississippi for over six months, it had
jurisdiction and the Court awarded Mr. Curtis custody.

(R. 261)

In Utah on January 12, 1989, Judge Park took proffer of
counsel on Mr. Curtis1 objection to the Domestic Commissioner's

5

recommendation.
advisement.

(R.

(R. 377)

The Court took the case under

445)

On approximately January 23, 1989, counsel for Mrs. Curtis
in Mississippi appealed the decision, which appeal is still
pending.
The Utah Court's decision was issued March 7, 1989, and we
appeal from that decision.
C.

(R. 359-364)

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.

On March 7, 1989, Judge Boyd L. Park took the case from
under advisement and found as follows:
(a)

Mr. Curtis failed to return the children in violation

of the Utah Decree of Divorce.

(R. 347)

(b) Mrs. Curtis personally appeared and litigated issues in
Mississippi as well as filed and responded to motions and that
she had been present and had otherwise entered a general
appearance in the Chancery Court of Scott County, State of
Mississippi, and had participated in a three day trial there
where she had been afforded all constitutional rights available
to anyone in this country who is involved in litigation.

(R.

350)
(c)

A year after the litigation was initiated in

Mississippi, and just prior to making this decision that we
appeal from, Judge Park, pursuant to the language in Coppedge vs.
Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah, 1985) conducted an extensive

6

telephone conference with Judge Hunter of the Chancery Court of
Scott County, State of Mississippi, who presided over the matter
concerning the merits and procedure of the case.

During this

conference both Courts recognized that the State of Utah and the
State of Mississippi have adopted the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, the provisions of which apply equally to both
states.

Both Courts also recognized that only one state—the

state of continuing jurisdiction—has power to modify a divorce
decree.

Both Courts further adhered to the principle that only

the state with continuing jurisdiction decides whether to decline
the exercise of its jurisdiction over the Decree of Divorce.
Both Courts concluded there can be no concurrent jurisdiction
between the State of Utah and State of Mississippi and that under
normal circumstances Utah has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders concerning the custody of
children when such matters have been previously decided in a Utah
Decree of Divorce.

Both Courts further agreed that the parties

may avail themselves of another jurisdiction if one party meets
the residency requirements of that jurisdiction and the other
party appears for the purpose of hearing the matter on its
merits.

(R. 353-354)

The Court concluded as a matter of law that:
(a)

The Court was mandated to follow Utah Code Ann., § 30-

3-5 which provides for continuing jurisdiction. (R. 354, 359-360)
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(b)

The purpose of the UCCJA is to present a parent from

wrongfully taking a child to another state to secure a custody
change.
(a)

(R. 354-355, 360)
The Court concurs with the opinion that the 'clean

hands doctrine' is incorporated in the UCCJA in that a court
should refuse to assume jurisdiction to reexamine an out of state
custody decree when the petitioner has engaged in some
objectionable scheme to gain physical custody of the child in
violation of the decree.

(R. 355, 360)

But there is no finding

as to which party violated the 'clear hands doctrine.'
(d)

Personal jurisdiction over a Defendant may be obtained

by making a voluntary appearance after the filing of the action.
(R. 356, 360-361)
(e)

Seeking affirmative relief changes status from special

appearance to that of a general appearance.
(f)

(R. 356, 361-362)

When Mrs. Curtis entered a personal appearance in

Mississippi, and participated in the hearing, the result was that
she made a general appearance and submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the Mississippi Court.
(g)

(R. 357, 362)

By filing a Motion to Dissolve the Protective Order in

Mississippi Mrs. Curtis placed herself in Mississippi's
jurisdiction.
(h)

(R. 357, 362-363)

The court found that Mrs. Curtis was not entitled to an

Order to Show Cause holding Mr. Curtis in contempt, and that Mr.
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Curtis was entitled to Enforcement of the Mississippi Order.

(R.

358, 363)
D.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

During the course of the marriage the Respondent had been
severely physically abusive with the Appellant and the children.
Psychological reports which were conducted as part of the divorce
action confirmed the abusive personality profile that Mrs. Curtis
could testify to and that police reports on incidences of
domestic violence would support.

(R. 282-287)

The homestudy

evaluator suggested that the Defendant get custody of the older
children because of his concern that if Mr. Curtis had all of the
children taken from him, that he would resort to carrying out one
or more of his threats to either kidnap the children or kill the
whole family.

(R. 284)

In a supplement to the psychological

report, written just five months before Mr. Curtis took the
children to Mississippi, the evaluators revised their opinion
based on their fear of what Mr. Curtis might do:
In addition, Lauralee (Mrs. Curtis) made a recent trip
to Texas with Greg's (Mr. Curtis') approval to bring
both Jolene and Jason back to Utah. When she arrived
there with a friend, Linda Moulton, of Preston, Idaho,
Greg had one of his typical tantrums, bashing in
Lauraleefs car, physically choking and bruising Linda
and so on. Greg ended up spending the night in jail
for disturbing the peace and Lauralee and Linda left,
bringing only Jolene back to Provo. Jason was afraid
to come with them because he feared that his dad might
commit suicide or carry out another of his threats to
physically harm someone. (emphasis added)
Given this new information by Jolene and Lauralee it
would seem that Greg and Lauraleef s patterns are
9

becoming more and more clear, i.e., Lauralee is
stabilizing her living situation and her emotional
state, while Greg is deteriorating. I still have a
legitimate fear that Greg might physically harm himself
or others, especially if full custody is given to
Lauralee. Based on their activities, however, of the
past several months and for the children's welfare, I
would like to amend any previous recommendation and
suggest (1) that full custody of all the children be
granted to Lauralee; or (2) that custody of all the
children exc£|>t Dale (age 16) be granted to her. It
appears, at this time, that Dale prefers living with
his father, although I have not visited with him
directly. Jolene reports that he is smoking dope and
is somewhat unruly. Before final custody is granted, an
interview with Dale is recommended. (R.287)
It would have been very difficult for Mr. Curtis to go to
trial with this evaluation.

The parties stipulated that the

three oldest children would be allowed to choose who they wanted
to reside with, and Mrs. Curtis was to have custody of the four
youngest children.

The two oldest sons initially went with Mr.

Curtis.
Just two months after the Decree of Divorce had been
entered, on February 12, 1988, Mr. Curtis took the children for a
regularly scheduled weekend visitation.

(R. 406)

When he picked

up the children, he briefly spoke with Mrs. Curtis.

Mr. Curtis

had been exercising visitation every other weekend since the
divorce.

He did not mention on this occasion that he intended to

take the children out of the state for the visitation.

(R. 407)

As Mr. Curtis was driving off with the children, he said
something to the effect that she 'would get her Valentine's
.present.'

(R.257)

This made Mrs. Curtis suspicious and she went
10

to his landlord who told her that his apartment had been cleaned
out and was empty.

(R. 407)

Mrs. Curtis went to the police and

County Attorney and asked for help but was told there was nothing
they could do until he was late coming back from the visitation.
(R. 407)

Mrs. Curtis had no idea where Mr. Curtis had taken the

children until about a week later when she received papers in the
mail indicating that Mr. Curtis had filed for custody under the
Relief from Domestic Abuse provisions of the Mississippi Statutes
and a hearing deciding custody was scheduled for February 29,
1988.

(R. 408)

This was the first time that Mrs. Curtis knew

that the children were in Mississippi.

When Mrs. Curtis went

back to the County Attorney's Office, they told her it was
custodial interference and if Mr. Curtis even came back into Utah
they would arrest him.
could do.

Other than that, there was nothing they

Ironically, later when Mississippi issued a warrant

for Mrs. Curtis' arrest for taking the children back to Utah,
even though their own Court admitted they did not have
jurisdiction, it was Utah County Law Enforcement officers who
arrested her, and the Utah County Attorney's Office that pressed
charge against her based on the Mississippi Warrant.
Mrs. Curtis contacted an attorney in Utah and he advised her
to appear in Mississippi.

Mrs. Curtis contacted Legal Services

in Mississippi and they agreed to help her try to dismiss the
case.

On February 26, 1988, Mrs. Curtis' counsel in Mississippi
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had filed a Motion to Dismiss based on improper jurisdiction.
This motion was not ruled on prior to the scheduled hearing.

The

Court planned to proceed with the litigation, which was conducted
February 29-March 2, 1988.

At the conclusion of the proceeding

in Mississippi, the Court entered a Protective Order against Mrs.
Curtis and took the issue of Modification of the Utah Decree
under advisement.

(R. 258)

Five months after taking the issue

under advisement, on August 9, 1988, the Mississippi Court
decided that did not have jurisdiction to Modify the Utah Decree
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, but the Mississippi Court still did
not dissolve the Protective Order.

(R. 208 - 213)

In August of

1988, Appellant contacted Utah Legal Services in an attempt to
get relief from the Utah Courts.

In August the Appellant signed

an Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show Cause in Re
Contempt.

Because of difficulties in serving the Respondent, the

Order to Show Cause was not held until November 10, 1988.
259, 260)

(R.

The Order to Show Cause was conducted before Domestic

Commissioner Howard Maetani who ruled that Utah had not
relinquished jurisdiction and did not recognize the Mississippi
Order.

(R.

156)

Mr. Curtis objected to the Commissioner's

recommendation and requested a hearing before a judge.
The rest of the case history is recited under "Course of
Proceedings" above.
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(R. 377)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mississippi does not have proper jurisdiction under the
UCCJA.

Utah had continuing jurisdiction that had never been

relinquished.

Mississippi's own Court agreed that it did not

have proper jurisdiction when the Petition to Modify was filed in
February of 1988.

The Mississippi trial court used the Relief

from Domestic Abuse Statute to keep the children in the state of
Mississippi through a protective order in effect for one year.
It violates the purposes of the UCCJA to allow Mississippi to
claim jurisdiction under the home state provision of the UCCJA
for the Petition to Modify filed in November of 1988 after
detaining the children in the State through the use of another
Statute.
Mrs. Curtis' personal appearance in Mississippi does not
establish proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA.

Personal

appearance in a custody case is not the standard for determining
proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA.

The purpose of the UCCJA is

to set uniform standards for determining the best state to hear
the custody issues—no where does it indicate that personal
appearance waives the Court responsibility to look at the bases
of jurisdiction.
When two states have conflicting claims to custody, the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act controls, and under its terms
Utah is the proper forum.

By the very terms of the PKPA, it

13

controls in cases of two states with conflicting claims.
the only state that meets both prongs of the test.

Utah is

Therefore, it

would violate the policy of the UCCJA to uphold and enforce the
Mississippi Order.

Utah was and is the proper jurisdiction for a

divorce modification proceeding.
ARGUMENT
I.

MISSISSIPPI DID NOT AND DOES NOT NOW HAVE PROPER JURISDICTION

UNDER THE UCCJA
A.

Utah had continuing jurisdiction that had never been

relinquished at the time Mississippi entered its Orders.
The Utah trial court found that Utah retains continuing
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5(3):
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental
care, or the distribution of the property as is
reasonable and necessary.
Because Utah had admittedly been the state with the original
jurisdiction it maintains jurisdiction to make changes in
custody.

Especially since the Utah Court had such recent (the

Divorce had been final for only 10 weeks) information, including
psychological evaluations on the parties and their children the
Utah Court was the only appropriate Court in which to seek a
modification.
The Utah Court of Appeals recently affirmed that Utah trial
courts have continuing jurisdiction after an initial Decree is
14

awarded in Utah.
1988).

Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, (Utah App.,

The facts of this case differ from the Curtis case in

that the primary issue in Rawlings was visitation, not custody.
Also in Rawlings both Courts conferred and agreed that Utah was
the appropriate jurisdiction.

A judges conference did not happen

for over year after the matter was filed in Mississippi.
Mr. Curtis argues that because there was no action pending
in Utah at the time he filed in Mississippi, Mississippi had no
obligation to contact the Utah Courts.

The Court refutes this in

Rawlings.
In Rawlings the custodial parent moved to another state.
When the non-custodial parent filed an order to show cause in
Utah, the custodial parent asked for a transfer of venue.

The

Utah Court denied the transfer of venue and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.

The Court of Appeals

recognized that the Utah trial court had continuing jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5(3).

The analysis of the

court's holding in response to the custodial parent's argument
that the state was an inconvenient forum applies directly to the
Curtis case:
Only if Utah chooses to relinquish jurisdiction, based
on the best interests of the children, will such
jurisdiction transfer.
The Court then noted in footnote 4:
It may be argued that jurisdiction may be obtained
through the emergency provision in section 78-45c3(1)(c) as was done in this case. However, accepting
15

such jurisdiction on an emergency basis does not give
permanent jurisdiction. The court is still required to
contact the original state Court to determine which
court is most convenient and best serves the interests
of the children and the parties.
According to footnote 4, even if the Mississippi Court was
acting pursuant to the emergency circumstances provision in
granting the protective order, the Mississippi Court was still
required to contact the Utah Court.
In a concurring opinion in Rawlings, Judge Bench referred to
the Commissioner's note to Utah Code Ann., § 78-45c-14:
Courts which render a custody decree normally retain
continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree under
local law. Courts in these states have in the past
often assumed jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state
decree themselves without regard to the preexisting
jurisdiction of the other state. In order to achieve
greater stability of custody arrangements and avoid
forum shopping, subsection (a) declares that other
states will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the
court of another state as long as that state has
jurisdiction under the standards of this Act. In other
words, all petitions for modification are to be
addressed to the prior state if that state has
sufficient contact with the case to satisfy § 3.
Judge Bench concluded:
At Rawling's request, Washington took emergency
jurisdiction under UCCJA. On discovering that Utah had
continuing jurisdiction over custody, Washington
declined any further jurisdiction under section 14(1).
That was precisely what should have happened under
UCCJA. Because Utah had primary jurisdiction over
custody of the children, I concur in affirming the
judgment of the trial court. Id. at 1330.
In the Curtis case, Utah did have sufficient contact with
the children to satisfy § 3, so the Mississippi Court should have

16

contacted Utah prior to conducting a hearing.

Mississippi

should have declined further jurisdiction as the State of
Washington did in Rawlings.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that a Court must contact the
original Court in Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah,
1985).

In Coppedge the grandparents of the child were the first

to file and serve from the Oregon Court.

There had been no

previous Utah order, because the child had been born and raised
in Utah and was voluntarily sent to Oregon.

The parents in Utah

were given poor advice by an attorney not to respond to the
Oregon petition because they did not have jurisdiction.

When the

parents began to understand that they were about to lose custody
of the child they had voluntarily sent to Oregon to live with his
grandparents for the school year, they filed an action in Utah.
Judge Harding acted in accordance with what seemed a reasonable
request:

Enter a Order allowing the natural parents to be able

to retain custody of their own child, especially since there were
no allegations of unfitness.

When the grandparents sought the

writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court, the Court must certainly
have been sympathetic with the Utah couple and the facts of the
case.

But the Supreme Court understood that if the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction Act is ever going to have real effect, it is
essential for a court learning of a prior proceeding in another
state, to contact the original state.

17

Because Utah did not

contact the Oregon Court, the Supreme Court sent a firm message
to the trial courts:

We will not uphold your orders unless you

comply with the terms of the UCCJA.

In the Curtis case, an order

had been made, Utah made the initial decree and had continuing
jurisdiction.

When Mississippi was made aware of this fact, they

should have contacted Utah.
Mr. Curtis argued that pursuant to Coppedge, the Utah Court
should have contacted the Mississippi Court when it realized that
there was an action pending because the Mississippi Orders had
been filed in the Utah Court file.

Mr. Curtis then argues that •

because Mrs. Curtis1 Affidavit in Support of an Order to Show
Cause In Contempt did not specify that she had appeared in a
hearing in Mississippi that the Commissioner entered the wrong
recommendation.

Mrs. Curtis1 Affidavit was meant to support an

Order to Show Cause, not to fulfill the requirements of Utah Code
Ann., § 78-45c-9.

Although, the Plaintiff's affidavit does not

specify that she attended the proceeding, the Commissioner was
informed verbally at the Order to Show Cause of the specific
proceedings as they occurred in Mississippi.

Opposing Counsel

was present and had the opportunity to put forth any additional
information that the Court was not aware of.

When the

Commissioner made his recommendation he knew of the action in
Mississippi, of the litigation that took place there, and of the
current status.

The Commissioner determined, based on all of the

18

facts, that because Utah had never relinquished jurisdiction,
therefore, Utah did not recognize the orders of the Mississippi
Court.

The Plaintiff's affidavit outlined enough facts to give

the Commissioner notice that another proceeding had been
initiated in Mississippi.

But because Utah had continuing

jurisdiction that had never been relinquished, Commissioner
Maetani held that it was the Mississippi Court's responsibility
to contact the Utah Court.
In a very recent case, Harris v. Melnick, Md. CtApp, No. 181988, 1/19/89, the court quotes Professor Brigitte M.
Bodenheimer, who wrote Interstate Custody:

Initial Jurisdiction

and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203,
215 (1981):
...the rule governing modification jurisdiction are
markedly different from the rules applicable to initial
jurisdiction.
The court goes on to conclude:
This means that only one state--the state of continuing
jurisdiction—has power to modify the custody decree.
Only that state decides whether to decline the exercise
of its jurisdiction of any particular case. The rule
is clear and simple. There can be no concurrent
jurisdiction and no jurisdictional conflict between two
states.
According to the Court in Harris, Courts generally give the
decree rendering state a strong presumption of continuing
modification jurisdiction until all or almost all connection with
the parents and child is lost.
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Appellate Courts are adopting the position that custody
should be determined by the home state as set forth in the UCCJA.
Prior to another state modifying that decree, the state of
original jurisdiction must relinquish its jurisdiction.

In the

Curtis case, the Utah court had not relinquished its
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the Plaintiff appeared
personally in the proceedings in Mississippi or not.

Based on

the analysis of the Harris case, as well as the other case law
previously cited, Utah had not relinquished jurisdiction over the
Curtis children at the time the Mississippi Orders were entered.
B.

Mississippi's own Court agreed that it did not have

proper jurisdiction when the Petition to Modify was filed in
February of 1988.
On August 9, 1988, the Mississippi Court Dismissed the
Petition to Modify the Foreign Decree, finding that under the
UCCJA both states could make claim to jurisdiction, but the PKPA
was determinative, and only Utah met both of the standards under
that act.

At that time, Mrs. Curtis had already entered her

personal appearance, yet this was not enough for the Mississippi
Court to determine that jurisdiction should remain in
Mississippi.

By the Court's own ruling, Mississippi did not have

proper jurisdiction, regardless of how it could be acquired
(emergency circumstances, best interests, consent, etc.)
Therefore, the Mississippi Court never entered a finding that it
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took jurisdiction pursuant to the emergency circumstances
provision of the UCCJA.
C.

The Mississippi trial court used the Relief from

Domestic Abuse Statute to keep the children in the state of
Mississippi through a protective order in effect for one year.
The Mississippi trial court in effect, circumvented the
entire UCCJA, by entering a one year protective order keeping the
children in the state of Mississippi.

After the children had

been in the state for over six months, the UCCJA could be applied
and a permanent Petition to Modify Custody could be awarded.
Allowing the Mississippi Court to use the state protective order
statute to supercede the UCCJA is a violation of the purpose of
the UCCJA, and undermines its entire purpose.

This policy

increases the potential for conflict with other court orders and'
hinders cooperation with courts of other states.
D.

It violates the purposes of the UCCJA to uphold and

enforce the Mississippi Order and to allow Mississippi to claim
jurisdiction under the home state provision of the UCCJA for the
Petition to Modify filed in November of 1988 after detaining the
children in the State through the use of the state protective
order statute.
In Utah Code Ann., § 78-45c-l the purposes of the adoption
of the UCCJA are enumerated.

They include:

(a)

avoid

jurisdiction competition and conflict ... which have resulted in
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shifting of children from state to state. ...; (b) promote
cooperation with the courts....; (c) assure that litigation ...
take place ... in the state with which the child and his family
have the closest connection ....; (d) discourage continuing
controversies....; (e) deter abductions and other unilateral
removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards; (f)
avoid relitigation of custody decisions....;

(g) facilitate the

enforcement of custody decrees of other states; (h) promote and
expand the exchange of information....;

(i) to make uniform the

law of those states which enact it.
The purposes for adopting the UCCJA are important to the
Curtis case because they explain the intent of the drafters in
how the procedure should apply in a contest of jurisdiction case.
Mr. Curtis did take the children on a regularly scheduled
visitation.

He had previously made arrangements with Mrs. Curtis

for an extended weekend visitation.

After getting the children

in the car his parting words to her were to the effect that she
'would get her Valentines' present.1

Mrs. Curtis knew after that

statement that Mr. Curtis was going to try to do something. Mrs.
Curtis called his landlord and learned that he had cleared out
the residence.

Mrs. Curtis contacted the police and was told

that there was nothing they could do until his visitation period
was over with.
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It was not until Mrs. Curtis was mailed copies of the papers
from Mississippi that she knew where Mr. Curtis had taken the
children.
Mr. Curtis alleges that he had every intention of returning
the children after the weekend, and illustrates this by saying
that he purchased round trip tickets, but when he "learned of the
serious nature of the abuse" he felt the need to file for
immediate relief.

Never does Mr. Curtis explain why he did not

tell Mrs. Curtis that he was taking the children out of the state
during the visitation, nor does he explain why, if he was going
to come back on his round trip tickets, he cleaned out his
residence in Utah.
The purpose of the adoption of the UCCJA is to prevent the
removing of children from one jurisdiction to another. Mr.
Curtis argues that he did not take the children illegally.
Perhaps, because of the way that Mr. Curtis arranged the move to
Mississippi he might not be convicted of a criminal offense,
although the Utah trial court did find that not returning the
children was a violation of the Decree of Divorce.

Mr. Curtis

has never been forced to answer how the circumstances were
conveniently set up.

In Utah homestudies had been completed

where there had been a visit to both homes, psychological
evaluations completed on both parties and the children had been
interviewed.

In the home evaluation conducted by the Scott
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County Social Services Department in Mississippi, a social worker
went to the home and spoke with the children.

Even with that

minimal amount of evaluating, the social worker reported that
three of the children reported to the worker that they wanted to
live with their mother.

The younger children state that their

father is gone to work before they get up, and he returns home
after they are in bed, six days a week.

Yet Mrs. Curtis was not

even consulted in the course of the Mississippi home evaluation.
In a later evaluation by the same social worker, the oldest
daughter told her that they had been told what to say by their
father.

The Social Worker later testified that she had no reason

to disbelieve the daughters last version of the facts.

There was

not the same type of evidence available in Mississippi as there
was in Utah.
All of the alleged acts of negligence and abuse by Mrs.
Curtis would have occurred in the State of Utah, if they had
taken place.

Yet there has never, even as of yet, been an

investigation of Mrs. Curtis' home in Utah.

There has never been

so much as a referral made to the Division of Family Services in
Utah.
To allow the non-custodial parent to take the children
legally on a visitation, go to another state and file under their
abuse statute, when the acts complained of occured in the
original state, violates the policy and purposes of the UCCJA.
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At the time Mr. Curtis took the children to Mississippi, he
did not even have residency there.

Through the provisions of the

Protection from Domestic Abuse Law, Mr. Curtis was allowed to get
the protective order and therefore, a custody order.

It has

never been explained why Mr. Curtis could not have gone back to
Utah, on his round trip tickets, and filed for a protective order
on the children and filed for a modification in Utah if the abuse
the children told him about was so severe.

The evidence of the

abuse would have been located in Utah, since the incidence
allegedly took place there.
Mr. Curtis violated the purpose of subsection (a) by
shifting the children from Utah to Mississippi, and causing a
jurisdictional conflict that could easily have been avoided.
At the time Mr. Curtis got the Ex Parte Protective Order, he
and the children had been in Mississippi for four days.

Moving

the children to Mississippi was a blatant violation of the
purpose listed in subsection (c), "assure that litigation ...
take place ... in the state with which the child and his family
have the closest connection....;"

Mississippi contained no

evidence of the abuse that was alleged to have occurred in Utah.
Utah assuredly had the closest connection with the family at this
point and could have provided the best evidence that the abuse
did or did not occur.

In fact, psychological evaluations had

been completed by both Mr. and Mrs. Curtis during the course of
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the divorce proceedings.

The psychologists could have been

available to testify in an abuse proceeding if it had been
conducted in Utah.

The evaluations explained that Mr. Curtis had

scores which are common to one who takes the law into his own
hands.

In fact, the evaluators later reconsidered their initial

determination that Mr. Curtis could possibly have custody of the
older children because a later violent incident.

The evidence

that is in Utah would have been very important in making an
accurate determination on the issues of abuse.
Subsection (d) states that the purpose is to discourage
continuing controversies over child custody.

If Mississippi were

allowed to take jurisdiction, it would set a dangerous precedent
contrary to the intent of the UCCJA.

Arguably there would be

nothing to stop Mrs. Curtis from exercising visitation with the
children in Mississippi, taking them to Florida (or any other
state), filing for a protective order based on events alleged to
have taken place in Mississippi and then getting an order from
the Florida court.

The procedure of taking the children from

state to state could go on indefinitely.
Mr. Curtis has alleged that he removed the children legally,
but subsection (e) addresses the unilateral removal of the
children undertaken to obtain custody awards.

It has never been

disputed that this was a unilateral removal, and the removal
would constitute a violation of the purposes of the Act.
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It is important to keep in mind that the Utah Decree of
Divorce was 10 weeks old when Mr. Curtis took the children to
Mississippi.

Mr. Curtis holds strongly to the position that

because the Mississippi Court entered findings after three days
of hearing on the protective order, that he was justified in
removing the children.

It is not hard to imagine how he would be

able to get these findings when all of Mrs. Curtis evidence would
obviously be in Utah, since that is where the alleged instances
occurred and all of the witnesses would be located.

Mrs. Curtis'

counsel in Mississippi was prepared to argue jurisdiction, but
with the short amount of time between Mrs. Curtis1 receiving
notice, securing counsel and getting to Mississippi, she had
little time and resources to refute the testimony that Mr. Curtis
had prepared.

For this very reason, the drafters of the UCCJA

determined one of the purposes is to have the case heard in the
state with the "closest connection and where significant
evidence" to the family is located.

The importance of ruling in

conformity with this purpose was illustrated in the recent case
In the interest of W. D. v. Drake, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, (1989).
The court ruled that "In the instant case, substantial
information concerning the parents' abilities and past history
was in California.

The mother had only recently come to Utah,

but had lived for years in California." Id. at 28. Because the

27

best information, and the substantial information concerning the
Curtis family was in Utah, jurisdiction should be in Utah.
II.

MRS. CURTIS' PERSONAL APPEARANCE IN MISSISSIPPI DOES NOT

ESTABLISH PROPER JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJA
A.

Personal appearance in a custody case is not the

standard for determining proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA.
Personal appearance in litigation is not the standard that
creates appropriate jurisdiction under the UCCJA.

The Court

ruled that because Mrs. Curtis personally appeared in the
proceeding in Mississippi that total jurisdiction would transfer
to Mississippi.

This has not been the recent trend of other

courts to address this same issue.

See Rawlings discussed above.

Mrs. Curtis did not give up her right to challenge the
appropriate jurisdiction under the UCCJA or PKPA.
The Plaintiff initially tried to have the action dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, but when it became apparent that
Mississippi would hear the case with or without Mrs. Curtis, she
did personally appear.

Other cases have held that personal

appearance does not effect subject matter jurisdiction covered by
the UCCJA.

In Mosely v. Huffman, 481 So.2d 231 (Miss., 1985) a

child's grandparents abducted the child from Mississippi and took
her to Arizona.

The child resided in Arizona for over two years

before the child's parents found her.

The grandparents initiated

an action in Arizona which the parents personally appeared in.
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the lower court that
ruled:
For the authorities to take the position and now tell
this mother, "You cannot have the custody of your
child," because of a hypertechnicality, when the
authorities provided little or no assistance in
locating the child from the outset would, in the
opinion of this Court, be an injustice. To now rule
that the state of residence of the grandmother is the
state of jurisdiction would be to reward the initiator
of a wrong. Neither the grandmother, by abducting the
child, nor the mother, upon submitting herself to the
Arizona court can defeat the rights of this child and
deprive or relieve this court of its constitutional
duty. Original jurisdiction was, is, and remains
vested in the Chancery Court of the State of
Mississippi. Id. at 238.
In Mosley the grandparents blatantly abducted the child.
They arranged with the parents to take the child on a visit and
then did not return.

Mr. Curtis did the same thing on his

visitation, except that he "legitimized" it by getting a
protective order with only a matter of days notice to Mrs. Curtis
and when the alleged acts occurred in another state.
In re Marriage of Hopson, 110 Cal. App.3d 884, 168 Cal.Rptr.
345 (Cal. Ct.App 1980) dealt with a case where a father
wrongfully took his two children from California to Tennessee,
although it was not certain that in doing so he violated a
custody decree, and initiated proceedings in Tennessee to modify
the Arizona custody decree.

Seventeen months later a final

judgment awarding custody to the father was entered.

Thereafter,

the mother sought enforcement of the Arizona custody order in
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California.

The father argued that the mother appeared

personally in Tennessee to defend.

The trial court sustained the

father and dismissed the petition.

The California Court of

Appeals reversed and observed that the res judicata effect of a.
custody decree was dependent upon the court having personal and
subject matter jurisdiction, and the exclusive method of
determining subject matter jurisdiction in child custody cases
was the UCCJA, which superseded any contrary decisional and
statutory law.

The court in Hopson then observed:

"There is no

provision in the act for jurisdiction to be established by reason
of the presence of the parties or by stipulation or consent."

Id

at 350-351.
The court npted that the UCCJA distinguishes illegal removal
or detention from all other custody violations, but the court
stated:

Giving recognition to the Tennessee decree condones the

father's behavior and encourages unlawful abduction; it invites
parental manipulation and deceit, while undermining the basic
parent-child relationship."

The Mississippi ruling certainly

invites "parental manipulation and deceit."
Mrs. Curtis' personal appearance in Mississippi is not the
determinative factor in deciding proper jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction must be determined according to the UCCJA.
It is contrary to the policy and purposes of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to assume that because a state has
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personal jurisdiction that the state may then automatically
assume jurisdiction under the UCCJA.
One of the purposes of the UCCJA is to set uniform standards
for determining the best state to hear the custody issues—no
where does it indicate that personal appearance waives the
Court's responsibility to look at the bases of jurisdiction.
III.

WHEN TWO STATES HAVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS TO CUSTODY, THE

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT CONTROLS, AND UNDER ITS TERMS
UTAH IS THE PROPER FORUM
A.

By the terms of the PKPA it controls in cases of two

states with conflicting claims.
In the August 9, 1988, Order from the Mississippi Court, the
Mississippi court did rule that where both states had claims to
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, their claim must yield to a Federal
Act of Congress, namely the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980, 28 U.S.C.A., § 1738A.

This statute provides:

(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of
the custody of the same child made by a court of
another State, if-(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child
custody determination, and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction to modify such determination.
Utah had not ever relinquished jurisdiction prior to the
entry of any of the Mississippi orders.

But more importantly,

where two states have claim to jurisdiction, the PKPA, a Federal
Act, requires that a modification can only occur where the
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modifying state has jurisdiction and the Court of the prior state
no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise it.

It is

clear that at least until Judge Park contacted Mississippi's
judge, Utah had not ever relinquished jurisdiction.

All of the

orders currently standing in Mississippi were entered prior to
that time.

Judge Park should not have relinquished jurisdiction.

At any given point, prior to Mississippi entering an order,
Mississippi could not meet both prongs of the PKPA standard.
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
A reversal of the trial court's decision to dismiss Mrs.
Curtis' Order to Show Cause in Contempt and a reversal of the
Order to Enforce the Mississippi Order.

More specifically, Mrs.

Curtis seeks the following:
1.

A determination that Mississippi, did not have proper

jurisdiction under the UCCJA.
2.

A determination that Mrs. Curtis' personal appearance in

Mississippi did not establish proper jurisdiction under the
UCCJA.
3.

A determination that Utah was and is the proper

jurisdiction to modify the Decree of Divorce.
4.

A determination that the PKPA controls when two states

have conflicting claims to custody, and only Utah meets both
prongs of the test.
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5,

A reversal of the trial court's order to dismiss the

Order to Show Cause in Contempt, and a reinstatement of the
Domestic Commissioner's Order that Mrs, Curtis should retain
custody, and that visitation by Mr, Curtis should be supervised.
6.

An award of attorney's fees and costs to Mrs. Curtis to

be paid by Mr. Curtis for Mrs. Curtis' attorney's benefit.
Plaintiff does not have the financial resources to pay her
attorney's fees and costs in this appeal, yet she has been forced
to incur such fees and costs to pursue her rights in this matter.
DATED this

/Q

day of August, 1989.
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann., § 78-45c-l, et seq.
Jurisdiction Act, (UCCJA).
28 USCS, § 1738A
PKPA).

(Uniform Child Custody

(Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,
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Section
78-45c-17.
78-45c-18.
78-45c-19.

78-45c-20.

78-45c-21.
78-45c-22.
78-45c-23.
CHAPTER 45b
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
(Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2; 1987, ch.
161, § 314; 1988, ch. 1, § 407.)
78-45b-l to 78-45b-25.

Repealed.

CHAPTER 45c
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Section
78-45c-l.
78-45c-2.
78-45c-3.
78-45c-4.
78-45c-5.
78-45c-6.
i

78-45c-7.

78-45c-8.

7£-45c-9.

78-45c-10.
78-45c-ll.
78-45c-12.
78-45c-13.
78-45c-14.
78-45c-15.
78-45c-16.

Purposes — Construction.
Definitions.
Bases of jurisdiction in this state.
Persons to be notified and heard.
Service of notice outside state — Proof of
service — Submission to jurisdiction.
Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction not exercised — Inquiry to
other state — Information exchange
— Stay of proceeding on notice of another proceeding.
Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum — Factors in determination — Communication with
other court — Awarding costs.
Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction — Notice to another jurisdiction — Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to
return child — Awarding costs.
Information as to custody of child and
litigation concerning required in
pleadings — Verification — Continuing duty to inform court.
Joinder of persons having custody or
claiming custody or visitation rights.
Ordering party to appear — Enforcement — Out-of-state party — Travel
and other expenses.
Parties bound by custody decree — Conclusive unless modified.
Recognition and enforcement of foreign
decrees.
Modification of foreign decree — Prerequisites — Factors considered.
Filing foreign decree — Effect — Enforcement — Award of expenses.
Registry maintained by clerk of court —
Documents entered.

78-45c-24.
78-45c-25.
78-45c-26.

Certified copies of decrees furnished by
clerk of court.
Taking testimony of persons in other
states.
Request to court of another state to take
evidence, to make studies or to order
appearance of party — Payment of
costs.
Taking evidence for use in court of another state — Ordering appearance in
another state — Costs — Enforce^
ment.
Preservation of records of proceedings —
Furnishing copies to other state
courts.
Requesting court records from another
state.
Foreign countries — Application of general policies.
Priority on court calendar.
Notices — Orders to appear — Manner
of service.
Short title.

78-45c-l. Purposes — Construction.
(1) The general purposes of this act are to:
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict
with courts of other states in matters of child
custody which have in the past resulted in the
shifting of children from state to state with
harmful effects on their well-being;
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of
other states to the end that a custody decree is
rendered in that state which can best decide the
case in the interest of the child;
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state
with which the child and his family have the
closest connection and where significant evidence
concerning his care, protection, training, arid
personal relationships is most readily available,
and that courts of this state decline the exercise
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have
a closer connection with another state;
(d) discourage continuing controversies over
child custody in the interest of greater stability
of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody
awards;
(0 avoid relitigation of custody decisions of
other states in this state insofar as feasible;
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other
states concerned with the same child; and
(i) to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this section.
i960
78-45c-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a
parent, who claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child;
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision and court orders and instructions provid-
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ing for the custody of a child, including visitation
rights; it does not include a decision relating to
child support or any other monetary obligation of
any person;
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings
in which a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of
marriage, or legal separation, and includes child
neglect and dependency proceedings;
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determination contained in a judicial decree
or order made in a custody proceeding, and includes an initial decree and a modification decree;
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the
child immediately preceding the time involved
lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months,
and in the case of a child less than six months old
the state in which the child lived from birth with
any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are
counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning a particular child;
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which modifies or replaces a prior decree,
whether made by the court which rendered the
prior decree or by another court;
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession
and control of a child;
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person,
other than a parent, who has physical custody of
a child and who has either been awarded custody
by the court or claims a right to custody; and
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
1980

78-45c-6

(c), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of
the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the
child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Subsection (1), physical presence in this state of the child, or
of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state
to make a child custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable,
is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his
custody.
1980
78-45c-4. P e r s o n s to b e notified a n d heard.
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to
the contestants, any parent whose parental rights
have not been previously terminated, and any person
who has physical custody of the child. If any of these
persons is outside this state, notice and opportunity
to be heard shall be given pursuant to Section
78-45c-5.
1980
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state — Proof
of service — Submission to jurisdiction.
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction
over a person outside this state shall be given in a
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice,
and may be made in any of the following ways:
(a) by personal delivery outside this state in
the manner prescribed for service of process
within this state;
(b) in the manner prescribed by the law of the
place in which the service is made for service of
process in that place in an action in any of its
courts of general jurisdiction;
(c) by any form of mail addressed to the person
to be served and requesting a receipt; or
(d) as directed by the court (including publication, if other means of notification are ineffective).
(2) Notice under this section shall be served,
mailed, delivered, or last published at least 10 days
before any hearing in this state.
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made
by affidavit of the individual who made the service, or
in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the
order pursuant to which the service is made, or the
law of the place in which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by
the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the
jurisdiction of the court.
1980

78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state.
( D A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a
child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the following paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child
at the time of commencement of the proceeding,
or (ii) had been the child's home state within six
months before commencement of the proceeding
and the child is absent from this state because of
his removal or retention by a person claiming his
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this
state;
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) 78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Juthe child and his parents, or the child and at
risdiction not exercised — Inquiry to
least one contestant, have a significant connecother state — Information exchange —
tion with this state, and (ii) there is available in
Stay of proceeding on notice of anthis state substantial evidence concerning the
other proceeding.
child's present or future care, protection, train( D A court of this state shall not exercise its jurising, and personal relationships;
diction under this act if at the time of filing the peti(c) The child is physically present in this state tion a proceeding concerning the custody of the child
and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is was pending in a court of another state exercising
necessary in an emergency to protect the child jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act,
because he has been subjected to or threatened unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the
with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise ne- other state because this state is a more appropriate
forum or for other reasons.
glected or dependent; or
(d) (i) It appears that no other state would
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody prohave jurisdiction under prerequisites substan- ceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and
tially in accordance with Paragraphs 'a), ib), or other information supplied by the parties under Sec-
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tion 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody registry established under Section 78-45c-16 concerning
the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child
in other states. If the court has reason to believe that
proceedings may be pending in another state it shall
direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or
other appropriate official of the other state.
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the
proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody
of the child was pending in another state before the
court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue
may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and
that information be exchanged in accordance with
Sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of
this state has made a custody decree before being
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court of
the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding
was commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to
the end that the issues may be litigated in the more
appropriate forum.
1980
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum — Factors in determination — Communication with other
court — Awarding costs.
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to
make an initial or modification decree may decline to
exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to
make a custody determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is
a more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made
upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a
party or a guardian ad litem or other representative
of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum,
the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this
purpose it may take into account the following factors, among others:
(a) if another state is or recently was the
child's home state;
(b) if another state has a closer connection
with the child and his family or with the child
and one or more of the contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily
available in another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum
which is no less appropriate; and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of
this state would contravene any of the purposes
stated in Section 78-45c-l.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court
of another state and exchange information pertinent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with
a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised
by the more appropriate court and that a forum will
be available to the parties.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient
forum and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or
it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a
custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions which
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may be just and proper, including the condition that a
moving party stipulate his consent and submission to
the jurisdiction of the other forum.
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding
while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other
proceeding.
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an
inappropriate forum it may require the party who
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the
costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is
to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to
the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under
this section the court shall inform the court found to
be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state
is not certainly known, shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate
official for forwarding to the appropriate court.
(9) Any communication received from another
state informing this state of a finding of inconvenient
forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of
the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction
the court of this state shall inform the original court
of this fact.
1980
78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for
refusing jurisdiction — Notice to another jurisdiction — Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to
return child — Awarding costs.
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may
decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of adjudication of custody if this is just and proper under the
circumstances.
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the
court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a
custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody has improperly removed the child from the physical custody
of the person entitled to custody or has improperly
retained the child after a visit or other temporary
relinquishment of physical custody. If the petitioner
has violated any other provision of a custody decree of
another state the court may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an initial custody decree pursuant to Subsection (1), the court shall notify the parent
or other appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other
state. If a request to that effect is received from the
other state, the court shall order the petitioner to
appear with the child in a custody proceeding instituted in the other state in accordance with Section
78-45c-20. If no such request is made within a reasonable time after such notification, the court may entertain a petition to determine custody by the petitioner
if it has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-2.
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction
to modify the custody decree of another state pursuant to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section
78-45c-14, the court shall notify the person who has
legal custody under the decree of the other state and
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the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other state and may order the petitioner to
return the child to the person who has legal custody.
If it appears that the order will be ineffective and the
legal custodian is ready to receive the child within a
period of a few days, the court may place the child in
a foster care home for such period, pending return of
the child to the legal custodian. At the same time, the
court shall advise the petitioner that any petition for
modification of custody must be directed to the appropriate court of the other state which has continuing
jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines
jurisdiction, to a court in a state which has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-3.
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may charge the petitioner
with necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorney's fees and the cost of returning the child to
another state.
1980
78-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and
litigation concerning required in
pleadings — Verification — Continuing duty to inform court.
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first
pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading
shall give information under oath as to the child's
present address, the places where the child has lived
within the last five years, and the names and present
addresses of the persons with whom the child has
lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavit
every party shall further declare under oath as to
each of the following whether:
(a) he has participated, as a party, witness, or
in any other capacity, in any other litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or
any other state;
(b) he has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending in a court of
this or any other state; and
(c) he knows of any person not a party to the
proceedings who has physical custody of the child
or claims to have custody or visitation rights
with respect to the child.
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items is
in the affirmative the declarant shall give additional
information under oath as required by the court. The
court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and as to other
matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the
disposition of the case.
(3) Each party h a s a continuing duty to inform the
court of any custody proceeding concerning the child
in this or any other state of which he obtained information during this proceeding.
1980
78-45c-10.

J o i n d e r of p e r s o n s h a v i n g c u s t o d y or

claiming custody or visitation rights.
If the court learns from information furnished by
the parties p u r s u a n t to Section 78-45c-9 or from other
sources that a person not a party to the custody proceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to
have custody or visitation rights with respect to the
child, it shall order t h a t person to be joined as a party
a n d to be duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of his joinder as a party. If the person joined
as a party is outside this state he shall be served with
process or otherwise notified in accordance with Section 78-45c-5.
1980
78-45c-ll.

Ordering party to a p p e a r — Enforcem e n t — Out-of-state party — Travel

and other expenses.

78-45c-15

(1) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in this state to appear personally before
the court. If that party has physical custody of the
child the court may order that he appear personally
with the child. If the party who is ordered to appear
with the child cannot be served or fails to obey the
order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the
court may issue a warrant of arrest against such
party to secure his appearance with the child.
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is
desired by the court is outside this state with or without the child the court may order that the notice
given under Section 78-45c-5 include a statement directing that party to appear personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear may
result in a decision adverse to that party.
(3) If a party to t h e proceeding who is outside this
state is directed to appear u n d e r Subsection (2) or
desires to appear personally before the court with or
without the child, the court m a y require another
party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and other
necessary expenses of t h e party so appearing and of
the child if this is j u s t and proper under the circumstances.
1980

78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree —
Conclusive unless modified.
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state
which had jurisdiction under Section 78-45c-3, binds
all parties who have been served in this state or notified in accordance with Section 78-45c-5 or who have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who
have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to
these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all
issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody
determination made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this act.
1980
78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees.
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce
an initial or modification decree of a court of another
state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory
provisions substantially in accordance with this act
or which was made under factual circumstances
meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so
long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially
similar to those of this act. .
1980
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree —
Prerequisites — Factors considered.
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state that
the court which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and
(b) the court of this state has jurisdiction.
(2) If a court of t h i s s t a t e is authorized under Subsection (1) and Section 78-45c-8 to modify a custody
decree of another state it shall give due consideration
to the transcript of t h e record a n d other documents of
all previous proceedings submitted to it in accordance
with Section 78-45c-22.
1980
78-45c-15.

Filing foreign d e c r e e —- Effect — Enf o r c e m e n t — A w a r d of e x p e n s e s .

(1) A certified copy of a custody decree of another
state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any
district court of this state. The clerk shall treat the
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decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the
district court of this state. A custody decree so filed
has the same effect and shall be enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this
state.
(2) A person violating a custody decree of another
state which makes it necessary to enforce the decree
in this state may be required to pay necessary travel
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the party entitled to the custody or his witnesses.
1980
78-45c-16. Registry maintained by clerk of
court — Documents entered.
The clerk of each district court shall maintain a
registry in which he shall enter all of the following:
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other
states received for filing;
(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other states;
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a court of another state; and
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody proceedings in another state
which m a y affect t h e jurisdiction of a court of this
state or t h e disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding.
1980
78-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished
by clerk of court.
The clerk of a district court of this state, at the
request of the court of another state or at the request
of any person who is affected by or has a legitimate
interest in a custody decree, shall certify and forward
a copy of the decree to that court or person.
i960
78-45c-18. Taking testimony of persons in other
states.
In addition to other procedural devices available to
a party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian ad
litem or other representative of the child may adduce
testimony of witnesses, including parties and the
child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state.
The court on its own motion may direct that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and may
prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon
which the testimony shall be taken.
1980
78-45c-19. Request to court of another state to
take evidence, to make studies or to order appearance of party — Payment of
costs.
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to hold a hearing to adduce
evidence, to order a party to produce or give evidence
under other procedures of that state, or to have social
studies made with respect to the custody of a child
involved in proceedings pending in the court of this
state; and to forward to the court of this state certified copies of the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise adduced, or any social
studies prepared in compliance with the request. The
cost of the services may be assessed against the parties.
(2) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to order a party to custody
proceedings pending in the court of this state to appear in the proceedings, and if that party has physical
custody of the child, to appear with the child. The
request may state that travel and other necessary
expenses of the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be assessed against another party
or will otherwise be paid.
1980
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78-45c-20. Taking evidence for use in court of
another state — Ordering appearance
in another state — Costs — Enforcement.
(1) Upon request of the court of another state the
courts of this state which are competent to hear custody matters may order a person in this state to appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or to produce or
give evidence under other procedures available in
this state. A certified copy of the transcript of the
record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise adduced shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court to
the requesting court.
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give
his testimony or statement in this state for use in a
custody proceeding outside this state.
(3) Upon request of the court of another state a
competent court of this state may order a person in
this state to appear alone or with the child in a custody proceeding in another state. The court may condition compliance with the request upon assurance by
the other state that travel and other necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person
who has physical custody of the child cannot be
served or fails to obey the order, or it appears the
order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest against such person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state.
1980
78-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceedings — Furnishing copies to other state
courts.
In any custody proceeding in this state the court
shall preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any
record that h a s been made of its hearings, social studies, and other pertinent documents until the child
reaches 18 years o£ age. Upon appropriate request of
the court of another state the court shall forward to
the other court certified copies of any or all of such
documents.
1980
78-45c-22.

R e q u e s t i n g c o u r t r e c o r d s from another state.
If a custody decree has been rendered in another
state concerning a child involved in a custody proceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of
this state upon taking jurisdiction of the case shall
request of the court of the other state a certified copy
of the transcript of any court record and other documents mentioned in Section 78-45c-21.
1980
78-45c-23. F o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s — Application of
general policies.
The general policies of this act extend to the international area. The provisions of this act relating to
the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of
other states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody
rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations
if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were
given to all affected persons.
i960
78-45c-24. Priority on court calendar.
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding
which raises a question of existence or exercise of
jurisdiction under this act the case shall be given calendar priority and handled expeditiously.
1980
78-45c-25.

N o t i c e s — Orders to a p p e a r — Manner of service.
(1) Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty
upon the court to notify a party or court of a particular fact or action, such notification may be accom-

plished by the clerk of t h e court or a party to the
action upon order of the court.
(2) Orders of the court for parties or persons to app e a r before t h e court in accordance with t h e t e r m s of
t h i s act shall include legal and sufficient service of
process in accordance with t h e U t a h Rules of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise ordered for good cause
shown.
1980
78-45c-26. S h o r t title.
T h i s act m a y be cited a s t h e " U t a h Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act."
1980

28 USCS § 1738A

§ 1738A. Fui! faith and credit Riven to child custody determinations
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify
except as provided in subsection (0 of this section, any child custod) determination made consistently
with the provisions of this section by a court of another State.
(b) As used in this section, the term—
(1) "child** means a person under the age of eighteen;
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to custody or visitation of a
child;
(3) "custody determination** means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the
custody or visitation of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and
modifications;
(4) -home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the
case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of
such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as pan of the sixmonth or other period;
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning the same child,
whether made by the same court or not;
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has physical custody of a
child and who has either been awarded custod) by a court or claims a nght to custodv,
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child, and
(3) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States.
(c) A child custody determination made by a coun of a State is consistent with the provisions of this
section only if—
(1) such coun has jurisdiction under the law of such State: and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (I) is the home Slate of the child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding, or (u) had been the child's home State within six months before the date of the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his removal
or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State;
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (n) it is
in the best interest of the child that a coun of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child
and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such
State other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available m such State
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships.
(C) the child is physicall} present in such State and (1) the child has been abandoned, or (u) it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened
with mistreatment or abuse;
(DXO it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (Q, or
(E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose
jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and
(u) it is in the best interest of the child that such coun assume jurisdiction, or
(£) the coun has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section
(d) The jurisdiction of a coun of a State which has made a child custod} determination consistent!) with
the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section
continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable notice and opponunity to be heard shall be
given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any
person who has physical custody of a child
(0 A coun of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of
another State, if—
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination, and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction to modify such determination
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in an) proceeding for a custody determination
commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a coun of another State where such coun of that
other State is exercising junsdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody
determination
(Added Dec 28. 1980, P L. 96-611, § 8(a). 94 Stat 3569 )

